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Abstract
This paper aims to shed light on the putative functions of placing images in judi-
cial opinions from the judges’ perspective. Thus far, commentators have overlooked 
the functions that images play for judges when used in judicial opinions and conse-
quently have failed to provide a thorough understanding of the process. To help fill 
this gap, Jerome Frank’s ideas on judging will be presented. The argument goes that 
using images in judicial opinions can be interpreted as a way to enable the decision-
making process to be, as far as possible, devoid of hypocrisy, closer to judicial can-
dor and more open to scrutiny. This notion can be excavated from Frank’s works in 
light of the existential features of both passing judgments and articulating decision-
making processes by and for judges themselves. As will be shown, Frank’s views on 
judicial decision-making are more original and enlightening than critics might sug-
gest and they are particularly relevant when examining the use of images in judicial 
opinions from a judge’s perspective.
Keywords Images in law · Judicial opinions · Jerome Frank · Decision-making 
process · Judging · Judicial hunch
Particularly in common law countries, there is a mild trend towards incorporating 
images within judicial opinions and, more generally, legal documents as a whole. 
Although there are no exact statistics of the numbers of court judgments in which 
images have been used, it is reasonable to speculate that the use of images is likely 
to increase in the future. Although authors working on the visualization of law inter-
pret the use of images in judicial opinions as a prime example of a more general 
tendency towards a change in the template of law (from the text-based to image-
based) [e.g. 1, 21], their commentaries leave many fundamental questions unan-
swered. Consequently, there is a strong need for a more comprehensive and critical 
 * Mateusz Stępień 
 mateusz.stepien@uj.edu.pl
1 Department of Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, 
Bracka Street, 12, 31-007 Cracow, Poland
322 M. Stępień 
1 3
understanding of both the actual and the desirable roles that images play in judicial 
opinions.
This paper aims to shed light on the functions of placing images in judicial opinions 
from the judges’ perspective. Thus far, commentators have overlooked the functions 
that images play for judges when used in judicial opinions and consequently have failed 
to provide a thorough understanding of the process. To help fill this gap, I draw on 
Jerome Frank’s ideas on judging in order to show that using images in judicial opinions 
can be interpreted as a way to enable the decision-making process to be, as far as pos-
sible, devoid of hypocrisy, closer to judicial candor and more open to scrutiny. This 
notion can be excavated from Frank’s works in light of the existential features of both 
passing judgments and articulating decision-making processes by and for judges them-
selves. As will be shown, Frank’s views on judicial decision-making are more origi-
nal and enlightening than critics might suggest and they are particularly relevant when 
examining the use of images in judicial opinions from a judge’s perspective.
The discussion proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I review the up-to-date 
literature on the use of images in judicial opinions in order to extract the most domi-
nant threads of thought and to highlight the deficiencies in the way that these issues 
have been conceptualized and approached so far. The second section is devoted to the 
legal thoughts of Jerome Frank that are relevant to the practice of inserting images into 
legal documents. In this respect, Frank’s essay entitled Say it with Music [6, see also 
7: 165–189], which is devoted to the existential dimension of justifying decisions, is 
especially revealing. His thoughts on the judicial decision-making process and judicial 
opinions seem very contemporary and in tune with modern legal practice. As such, 
they can provide the necessary tools to fill an important gap in the literature regarding 
the use of images in court documents. The final section contains some basic conclu-
sions about the most important lessons learned from Frank’s contribution. The overall 
aim of the paper is to open up new perspectives for a more complete understanding of 
the roles that images currently play in justification and the roles that they could have in 
the future.
1  Dominant Threads in Literature
Although there are an increasing number of studies on images in judicial opinions [e.g. 
2, 3, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19] and on related, but mostly more general issues [1, 5, 12, 
17, 18, 20–22], the subject matter still remains outside of the mainstream of legal aca-
demia. Nevertheless, the recent scholarship provides a useful tool for reconstructing the 
dominant ways in which the practice has been conceptualized. It also helps us to better 
understand what is missing in the current literature. From all the works analyzed, four 
main approaches emerged.
1.1  Benefits and Harms Approach
Authors taking this approach commonly discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
(benefits and harm) of inserting images into judgments to ascertain the evaluative 
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character of the process. For example, Dellinger, a pioneer in studying non-textual 
elements in judicial opinions, highlights the “special dangers” of using visual mate-
rial in the attachments to judicial opinions [3: 1707]. Porter directly “analyzes risks 
and benefits of images in… judicial opinions” [19: 1698], and comments more gen-
erally on the “risks of visual advocacy” [19: 1752]. She says that if visual argument 
remains unregulated it threatens the “fundamental premises of legal discourse and 
decision-making” [19: 1694]. In a similar vein, Marder examines “the benefits and 
harms of the justices’ use of images in their opinions” [15: 357]. From a more gen-
eral perspective, Sherwin characterizes so-called “pictorial turn” in legal context as 
“a source of new opportunities as well as new dangers” [21: 119]. What is impor-
tant to note here is that virtually all the authors stress the negative aspects of using 
images in judicial opinions. This is so striking that Goodrich rightly notes that the 
general literature on the subject “is to date largely cautionary and exhortative” [9: 3, 
11].
Most of the authors fail to reveal their assumptions on how legal decisions are 
passed and on what functions judicial opinions fulfill, nor do they give any indi-
cations of their visions for future practice. But, without first establishing a contex-
tual framework, the “benefits and harms approach” seems to be seriously flawed. 
Any estimation of consequences of using images in judicial opinions presented by 
a given author cannot be fully apprehended and scrutinized if we don’t know their 
more basic thoughts about the legal decision-making process. Discussions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of a particular practice should contain a solid elabo-
ration on the standards or criteria adopted by the commenting author. It’s not good 
enough to make vague references to standards without explicating exactly what 
these standards are.
An example of this kind of incompleteness can be found in Porter, when she 
warns us that, if visual argument stays unregulated, it threatens the “fundamental 
premises of legal discourse and decision-making” [19: 1694]. It could be assumed 
that these “fundamental premises” work as evaluative standards. Unfortunately, 
exactly what these standards are remains a mystery. The actual set of premises used 
would obviously have a major bearing on the attitude towards inserting images into 
judicial opinions.
Johansen and Robbins give general advice on whether or not to use “visuals as 
legal reasoning” [12]. To this end, they point out three criteria: “enhancing the read-
er’s comprehension of the analysis”, “the document’s overall design” and “meeting 
professional norms”. Only after addressing all three should lawyers, which includes 
judges, decide whether or not to include “visuals” in their documents. Notice that 
only the first criterion has strong evaluative potential. According to Johansen and 
Robbins, the main (or even the only) rationale for using visuals in a legal context is 
to enhance the reader’s understanding of the document. Note that this leaves aside 
any discussions of any other putative functions of using images in judicial opinions. 
The second and third points (“document’s overall design” and “meeting the profes-
sional norms”) are not only indisputable when formulated in such an abstract way, 
but also they also appear trivial and superficial.
Starting from much broader perspective, Feigenson and Spiesel ask the question: 
“are digital images good for law?” [5: 196]. When addressing the “advantages and 
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disadvantages for legal judgments”, they list five normative criteria of “good and just 
decision making”: they have to be accurate; based on good thinking; reached in fair 
process; have an expressive value; and lead to desirable outcomes. Although those 
criteria are vague and to some extent overlapping, such an approach is undoubtedly 
more sophisticated and considered when compared to the earlier examples. What 
should be stressed, and what is typical in the literature as a whole, is that all the 
criteria mentioned are “external”. They are not related to the decision makers’ inner 
processes nor to the consequences of decisions on the judges themselves. Standards 
of “good and just decision making” proposed by Feigenson and Spiesel not only 
lack any references to judge-related issues, but they also completely neglect to tell 
us what they think the desirable features of judicial opinions are.
1.2  Visual Persuasion
Authors using this approach tend to view images in judicial opinions as an instance 
of a much broader trend towards using non-textual elements in legal documents in 
order to further rhetorical and argumentative aims. The “visual persuasion” approach 
dominates the recent literature. For instance, Dellinger writes on “visual argumenta-
tion” [3: 1705], pointing out the role of images in “supporting the argument”. Porter 
frequently uses phrases such as: “image-driven advocacy”, “new digital advocacy”, 
“visual argument”, “visual persuasion”, “visual tools of persuasion”, and “visual 
advocacy” [19]. Johansen and Robbins dwell on “visual persuasion” [12] and Mur-
ray elaborates on the general category of “visual legal rhetoric” [17, 18].
When viewed through that lens, judges who insert image into their opinions 
are seen as intentional agents trying to use the best available tools for persuading 
their audiences. Images are a fragment of the judges’ (and more generally lawyers’) 
rhetorical toolkit. From this instrumental perspective, images are just new tools 
for argumentation (in some cases, as Murray notes, the “sharpest” ones). Such an 
approach is based on underlying assumptions about both the ontology of images and 
the reasons why judges might choose to use them in their opinions. This “persua-
sion” framework also determines the evaluative criteria employed when consider-
ing the “benefits and harms” of such practice. To be sure, the power to influence an 
audience is a very important function, maybe even the most important, but it’s not 
the only legitimate reason for judges to use images in their opinions. Consequently, 
such a reduction is not desirable if the aim is to get a comprehensive view of the pro-
cess (a view supported by Goodrich [9: 39]). As a final point, because the visualiza-
tion of law takes place at the end of the decision-making process, authors claim that 
images are directed to future audiences, so giving further weight to their persuasive 
role. This appears to ignore the possibility that images may be used to help to articu-
late what happened earlier.
1.3  Accommodation Approach
From this perspective, the use of images in judicial opinions is an instance of a 
more general cultural process that is changing the character of law in the “digital 
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baroque” period [21]. Expansion of new media, armed with sophisticated tech-
nology, will sooner or later lead to the so-called “visualization” of law. This pro-
cess can be described as employing images in such a way as to make law more 
closely reflect changes in society as a whole. To put it another way, according to 
the “accommodation approach”, law ought to catch up with the reality of con-
temporary life and, with respect to judicial opinions, this can be achieved by 
changing the dominant text-centered mode of presentation in favor of a multime-
dia approach.
For example, Katsh, undoubtedly a pioneer of this way of thinking, writes 
about “ongoing pressures from the computer for law to accommodate itself to 
the visual and to employ new means to communicate” [13: 145]. Porter stresses 
the “irresistible force of these cultural and technological upheavals” [19: 1721] 
and Boehme-Neßler frames the practice of inserting pictures into judicial opin-
ions as an instance of the inevitable process of making law more and more based 
on “visual communication” [1]. Author of the seminal Pictorial Law, Boehme-
Neßler often gets close to the claim of technological determinism when he notes 
that “law will find it difficult to hold this hard line [i.e. being in opposition to 
visualization] in the future” [1: ix]. In a very similar way, Margolis stresses that 
“incorporating images and videos” into judicial opinions “is an inevitable part 
of the change brought by digital writing and reading” [14: 25]. Even Sherwin, 
an author known for his subtle and humanistic approach, asks, “how does visual 
culture alter the legal mind” [21: 3]. Thus, the assumption is that new cultural 
phenomena have already influenced the legal field. What is more striking, is that 
visual-based culture is treated as something external to be differentiated from 
traditional “word-based law”. What is more puzzling is that Sherwin asks “what 
constitutes prudent judgment in predominantly visual society?” [21: 6], rather 
than taking a less deterministic approach by questioning how prudent judgment 
could be reached in predominantly visual society. The general assumption here 
is that prudent judgment has been somehow changed due to technological devel-
opments. Sherwin tries to establish a virtual jurisprudence that would be “more 
suitable to the actual conditions of contemporary life” [21: 5]. So, according to 
Sherwin, both the practice of law and the way we theorize about it needs to be 
readjusted to fit to the digital world we live in.
The accommodation thesis brings with it the risk of conflating the descrip-
tive dimension (the world is changing in a certain way) with the normative one 
(law must catch up with the reality of contemporary life). The conclusion that 
because the world is in some way changing the legal sphere needs to change 
in a similar way is problematic. It leaves aside the question of the justified dis-
tinctiveness of law from an axiological and teleological perspective. Moreover, 
it frames the practice of using images in judicial opinions merely as a process 
associated with keeping up with a general trend in society. This approach falsely 
assumes a fundamental disconnection between law and culture and, furthermore, 
places culture as the driving force behind legal practice. As a consequence, the 
important nuances and particularities associated with the “visualization of law”, 
which are discussed later, are ignored.
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1.4  The Fetishization of Images
Regardless of whether the incorporation of images into judicial opinions is portrayed 
as a distinct practice or an example of more general tendencies within legal practice 
as a whole, images are most commonly conceptualized as a separate category, dis-
tinct from text. Understood in this way, they can then be explained and assessed en 
bloc. This tendency to homogenize images as single category and treat them as an 
unified group with shared features is termed the “fetishization of images”. Within 
such a view, images and text are separate symbolic modes that follow their own 
rules, one being autonomous from, or even in opposition to, the other. Using general 
quantifiers (which encompass large sets of designators) makes the whole set of items 
within each category easy to comprehend and provides ready-to-use general labels. 
This dichotomous mode of thinking, in which images oppose text, infiltrates the 
entire scholarship. Feigenson and Spiesel neatly summarize this dominant approach: 
“Law, like most other disciplines or practices that aspire to rationality, has tended 
to identify rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts rather than pictures” [5: 4]. 
Other authors express this attitude in a direct way. For instance, the power of images 
is described by Tushnet as “irrational” [22: 694] in contrast to text, which gives “an 
opportunity for explication and reflection” [3: 1704]. Images are referred as “entities 
that work more quickly and convey information intuitively” [19: 1752–1754] and 
“much more immediately and tightly linked with emotion than text is” [22: 2012: 
691; 9: 35].
Especially when looking from the functional perspective, images do not form a 
homogeneous category. Even if we take a particular type of image, such as pho-
tographs, they function differently in various situations [see 4]. What is striking, 
is that, when used in specific way, images can a play very similar role to a typi-
cal text-based communication. For example, maps and photos are commonly used 
to enhance the clarity and transparency of the narrative. Of course, some images 
can facilitate almost instant communication, while others encourage reflection and 
deeper scrutiny. Although it is freely admitted that images can hasten communica-
tion, bestow emotional potency, and help to simplify complex issues, in most actual 
instances, the use of images in judicial opinions results in more complex communi-
cations that require more time from the interpreter to reflect on the nuances. Overall, 
the literature places too much emphasis on the emotional qualities associated with 
using images in judicial opinions and tends to ignore their pragmatic and more sub-
tle uses.
At one extreme, images can have definitive prescribed sets of meanings and 
so operate in a similar way to the literal use of words. An example of this is the 
American DOT pictogram system used for traffic signs. Conversely, an abstract 
painting has no set meaning and any interpretation is subjective. In practice, most 
images, particularly within a legal context, fall somewhere in between and require 
a lesser or greater degree of interpretation. This is also true of text. Put over-
simply, words can be read as labels denoting actual things in the world, they can 
instruct, convey meaning through symbolism, or, in the case of some experimen-
tal poetry, be totally abstract. It’s not without a reason, that Horace in his Ars 
Poetica shows us the similarities between poetry and pictures (ut pictura poesis). 
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As Horace explains, “As is painting, so is poetry: some pieces will strike you 
more if you stand near, and some if you are at a greater distance: one loves the 
dark; another, not afraid of the critic’s subtle judgment, chooses to be seen in 
the light; one may please once whilst the other will give pleasure if ten times 
repeated” (translation by Christopher Smart). When linked in a certain way with 
text, images can be characterized as, using Jerome Frank’s categories, “sober”, 
“objective”, or “precise”. In different settings, images can be “quite thin” or 
“ephemeral”. However, in all cases they form a part of the larger communica-
tive framework. Rather than sticking to the dichotomous way of thinking about 
images and text, it’s more realistic to assume that text and images interrelate with 
each other.
Furthermore, the relationships between images and text can vary greatly accord-
ing to the character and context of each specific case. Where images are used, it is 
of crucial importance how they are mixed with textual elements, whether they are 
supplemented with additional textual comments, and whether the particular judge 
has a previous history of using them. In most well-known cases of using images in 
judicial opinions, judges have almost always tightly linked “the visuals”—often in a 
very direct way—to their textual comments and analysis. In these cases, images and 
words work hand-in-hand in forming the meanings. So the reflection on intersec-
tions between images and text in judicial opinion needs to be developed as a start-
ing point instead of fetishizing images. If we take for example the famous opinion 
by Judge Posner (Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Company, 662 F.3d 931 [7th Cir. 
2011]), where he included a photograph of an ostrich with its head in the sand next 
to a photograph of a man in a suit with his buried in the sand, it is only by reading 
the text that you understand that the mythical behavior attributed to ostriches was 
being used as a metaphor for the appellate lawyer’s failure to observe precedents in 
the case.
What is obvious is that nobody looks only at just the images in judicial opinions. 
Court rulings are not like TV or billboard advertisements that we can view semi-
focused. Knowing the context in which particular images are used is vital for their 
interpretation. For instance, how differently would a judicial opinion be interpreted 
if it were known that the author frequently used non-orthodox elements within legal 
documents as a personal stamp. Instead of holding onto the “fetishization of images 
approach”, the interpreter must assess how images relate to the text, taking each 
case on its own merit.
Summing up, none of the four dominant approaches adopted by scholars is 
completely inaccurate or totally invalid. The problem is that they present judi-
cial practice as more flat and homogeneous than it really is. Although there is 
an important rationale behind the “benefits and harms approach”, authors need 
to frame this within their understanding and expectations of judicial practice. 
Authors that focus on “visual persuasion” tend to blind themselves to other plau-
sible reasons why images are used in judicial opinions. The “accommodation” 
framework maintains that the use of images is as a result of pressure to catch 
up with society as a whole. Not only are the premises unsubstantiated but such 
a view undermines the positive and proactive approaches to using images in 
legal documents. “Fetishization of images” leads to a gross simplification of the 
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understanding of how images work and ignores the relationships between images 
and text that play a vital role in interpretation.
As stated above, using images in judicial opinions can be comprehensively 
evaluated only against an assumed descriptive and normative vision of the deci-
sion-making process. Different choices in this respect inevitably determine the 
approach toward the practice of inserting images by judges.
2  Frank on Judicial Opinions
One of the reasons why Frank’s legal thoughts have not been utilized for the study of 
court opinions to date is most likely because of the superficial readings of his ideas 
as an attempt to incorporate aspects of Freud’s psychological theories into the legal 
sphere. In this respect, Horwitz rightly takes a quite different track than most com-
mentators, describing Frank’s book Law and the Modern Mind as embodying an 
“existentialist” strand of Legal Realism [11: 176–177]. Although Horwitz does not 
develop this idea further, it can be noted that Frank claims that there are existential 
conditions of legal decision-making that are not dependent on institutional or organ-
izational factors. At this point, it is useful to note that, at the beginning of his career, 
Frank worked as a successful corporate lawyer, then served as a high-level federal 
public official, and ultimately became a distinguished federal appellate judge [8, 23]. 
He had first-hand experience relating to judging and writing judicial opinions.
Many commentators acknowledge that Frank stresses the ongoing effects of sub-
jectivity during decision-making processes and, as a consequence, the uncertainties 
inherent in judging. Frank takes this further by pinpointing a set of deeper, more 
crucial determinants in the judging process. The most important of these are:
1. The fundamental role of the hunch in judicial decision-making. This does not 
mean that the decision-making process is either irrational or lacks any inherent 
control mechanisms. The decision-maker will most often try to evaluate initial 
hunches by employing legal rules and juristic methods, so in effect, re-working 
the case material.
2. The impossibility of eliminating emotions from the judging process, whether 
negative or positive. For Frank, emotions are an essential part of the legal deci-
sion-making process at the descriptive level, though their evaluation is a separate 
matter.
3. The non-linear character of the actual judicial decision-making process, in con-
trast to the linearity of decisions suggested by the official narrative.
4. The uniqueness of each decisional situation, including the decision-makers’ mind-
set.
5. The complex and dynamic character of the inner experiences of a judge (which 
are idiosyncratic) and their crucial role in the processes of reaching decisions.
6. The inevitable separateness of decision-maker from the external world and even 
from his previous experiences.
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According to Frank, judicial decisions are reached in a quite different way than 
traditional theories assumed. To better capture how judicial decisions are made, 
Frank refers to the concept of gestalt [6: 928], the “wholeness” of both the judge’s 
experiences during case that influence the decision-making process and the judge’s 
response toward the case. What is crucial here is that the gestalt-like characteristic 
of judging, “the non-analytical character of the decisional process” [6: 928], impacts 
other aspects of the decisional process and the judicial opinions. One of the most far 
reaching consequences is the existence of inherent and unavoidable problems with 
the articulation of decisional premises (“real reasons”). As Frank states, a judge 
“experiences a gestalt; that is why he has difficulty in reporting his experiences ana-
lytically” [6: 929]. This produces problems with internal communication, “inside 
the judge,” and, no matter how awkward it may seem, between the judge and the 
judges’ opinions. These findings are rarely acknowledged in the prevailing literature, 
but, for Frank, the fundamental difficulty of judges in articulating their reasoning at 
the end of a case cannot be eliminated completely. It is important to note that Frank 
is an adherent of a judicial candor and a strong critic of hypocrisy in legal decision 
making. This helps explain why he was strongly committed to reporting the prob-
lems of of reporting what actually happens during the decision-making process at 
the justification stage.
So why, according to Frank, does the gestalt-like character of judging lead to 
serious troubles with articulating decisional premises? Put simply, the idiosyncratic 
and gestalt-like experiences of a judge cannot be reduced to simple propositional 
theses without loosing something important. This is the main reason why decision 
makers have a fundamental difficulty in articulating these experiences, even for 
themselves. Frank uses the term of “inexpressibility of the decisional process” to 
highlight the problems with formulating what really happens when passing a deci-
sion in a “logical, lingual form”. Judges’ responses are partly based on and bounded 
by their “<wordless knowledge>” [6: 932]. Meanings that lay beyond the discursive 
form cannot, without distortion, be conveyed in words. There is always a part of the 
decisional premises that is “unspeakable” and so cannot be written down. The above 
is true in relation to particular feelings, emotions, and hunches, but relates most 
especially to the holistic-type experiences, which consist of many smaller elements, 
some of which are impossible to put labels on. To some degree, any attempt to place 
such an element into a “logical verbal form must distort it” [6: 933].
According to Frank, the decisional processes of judges have some similarities 
with “the artistic process”, namely the act of discovery, the inevitability of crea-
tivity, and the strong impact of personality. What is crucial here for Frank, is that 
judges’ decisional experiences, like those of an artist, cannot be repeated. They hap-
pen only once. This unrepeatability influences the final shape of a particular judicial 
opinion, which, according to Frank, is to some degree, always unauthentic, formu-
lated on a slippery basis, and based on premises that are distant from what really 
happened. But for Frank the use of non-orthodox tools by judges can reduce these 
dysfunctional states.
Before we get to those judicial candor-enhancing devices, it’s worth noting that 
when Frank stresses the inherent limitations of writing as a tool that is unable to cap-
ture the judges’ gestalt experience, he relies mainly on Susanne Langer’s comments 
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on language and her criticism of logical positivism [6: 939]. Langer emphasizes the 
linear and successive character of words, limitations of written communication that 
“sets bounds to the complexity of speakable ideas”, rendering certain ideas “too 
subtle for speech”. This explains failures of writing to comprehend certain ideas 
contained within emotions and memories. As a kind of remedy she introduces the 
possibility of “wordless symbolism”. Echoing Langer’s views, Frank sees these 
same “inherent weaknesses of language” [6: 931] relating to the preparation of judi-
cial opinions.
Against such background, we should understand Frank’s essay Say It With Music 
as a direct call to judges to acknowledge the inherent weakness of words. Say it with 
music is the title of an Irving Berlin song that was very popular in the 1940’s. The 
lyrics indicate that love is a complex, internal state that cannot be communicated 
easily and accurately with words. Frank uses this analogy to emphasize the impor-
tance of non-verbal elements. According to Berlin’s song, we should make use of 
music when we want to express our feelings. When speaking about love it always 
appears that something has been left out, usually the parts that are most vivid, cru-
cial, subtle, moving and transforming. To Frank, at a deeper level and only to some 
extent, a judge faces similar existential troubles while articulating the reasons of 
an already reached decision. The suggestion is that, although there is a significant 
quantitative difference between a lover and a judge, judges should follow the exam-
ple of the lover from Berlin’s song and try to “say it with music”.
By “music”, Frank is obviously referring to finding alternative ways to express 
experiences that are difficult to accurately capture in words. Music, for example, 
allows for a more nuanced expression of emotional thoughts, but there are other 
tools that could be used, most notably images. Say It With Music is an invitation 
for judges to use “new forms to symbolize feelings” [6: 931] in order to express the 
actual decisional premises in a more authentic way (primarily for themselves). Frank 
realized that this was a somewhat idealistic notion. Even armed with “musical tools” 
(which have their own limitations), judges would never be in a position to be able to 
fully articulate all premises of their decisions; the ways they report their cases will 
never be completely adequate and transparent for themselves and others [6: 933]. 
However, Frank does not see this as a reason not to try and he encourages legal deci-
sion makers to make this process as sincere, transparent and open to scrutiny as pos-
sible by criticizing the dominant, “purist” template of judicial opinions [see e.g. 20]. 
The gestalt-like experiences of judges require new tools of expression which work in 
gestalt-like fashion, enabling the reader to take them all in at once.
Frank’s approach may sound radical but it is consistent with his general view on 
law and legal decision-making and of the myth-making processes of both. Author 
of Law and Modern Mind, Frank believes that encouraging authenticity (judicial 
candor) could bring about fundamental changes to how law works. Looking from 
the perspective of rational critique of the decision, the gap between actual reasons 
for decisions and their official justifications bring multiple dysfunctions, especially 
when considered in a long run. Moreover, according to the transmission model of 
communication, information that is yet to be well established and crystallized can be 
transmitted via different mediums. So what would be changed if we were to assume 
that a large part of the judging process could not be articulated discursively and, 
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to some degree, even stays beyond the consciousness of the decision-maker? In 
this case there is no analytically differentiated quanta of information waiting to be 
“transmitted”. This opens up the possibility of a new function for inserting images 
into judicial opinions. Frank’s elaborations show that using images is not limited 
to reasons or justification, but it could also help judges express what actually hap-
pens when passing decisions in a more meaningful and accurate way. Thus, images 
can be seen also as tools for self-expression, or even self-discovery, for judges, by 
fulfilling the following putative functions: (1) a way of expressing the decision-mak-
ers’ gestalt, (2) as an individualization device that help judges to express their idi-
osyncrasies in a meaningful and relevant way, (3) as a tool to help decision makers 
explore the phenomenology of their own legal judgments. The message for future 
authors on the visualization of law is that is vital to understand the judge’s role in 
the decision-making process when commenting on the function of images in judicial 
opinions.
3  Summary: Filling the Gap
Frank’s ideas offer new light on the use images in judicial opinions. These are the 
most basic conclusions:
(1) Images can fulfill a variety of functions when used in judicial opinions. Any 
assessment of this practice always rests, whether the auditor is aware of it or not, on 
an initial assumption about judicial decision-making and judicial opinions at both 
the descriptive and the normative level. For example, if one treats the articulation of 
legitimate reasons for the judgment as more important than an adequate reporting 
of the course of the decision-making process, he would most likely accept inserting 
the images, but only when they are used to enhance the clarity of presented reasons. 
On the other hand, when the reporting is seen as more important, different usages 
of images in judicial opinions would be acknowledged as both functional and legiti-
mate. From a different angle, believing that both the form and content of judicial 
opinions should be more in tune with cultural and technological changes implies 
more open and positive attitudes toward using images in judicial decisions. Gener-
ally, commentators who are strongly attached to the orthodox vision of legal opin-
ions would not be so open and receptive to the project of making them more sound 
to the popular culture. Notice that a few instances of inserting images into judicial 
opinions can be fairly interpreted as an attempt to make judicial opinions more in 
tune with the dominant culture (see the Grayson v. Schuler case [666 F.3d 664 {7th 
Cir. 2012}], where the judge inserted the photo of Bob Marley in order to show how 
dreadlocks look like).
(2) Current scholarship limits the potential functions of images in judicial opin-
ions to exclude functions that relate specifically to the authors of those opinions. 
As we have seen, this is mostly as a result of the dominance of the “visual persua-
sion” approach in recent literature. As Frank teaches, elaborations on visual com-
munication should also embrace the internal communication of the decision maker 
and its relation with final product. The power of images has to be recognized also for 
the decision makers themselves. Thus, images can help to facilitate the tensions or 
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internal communications that occur between a decision maker’s thoughts at a certain 
point in time, his earlier recollections during the decision-making process, and the 
final published decision. Frank opens the window for issues related to the “com-
munication of judges with their own opinions”. In this sense images have an invalu-
able potential to enable communication in ways that words cannot do, both for the 
author and interpreter. Consider the dissent opinion of judge Damon J. Keith in the 
Northeast Ohio Coalition v. Husted (837 F.3d 612 [6th Cir. 2016]) case regarding 
the constitutionality of the State of Ohio amendment to the voting laws. Judge Keith 
expressed strong emotional reaction to the majority decision upholding laws under 
scrutiny, which—according to Keith—de facto restricts the voting rights (especially 
for minorities) and violates the Constitution (“I am deeply saddened and distraught 
by the court’s deliberate decision to reverse the progress of history. I dissent”). Sec-
ond, the Judge tried to put the whole issue in the larger context of struggles for equal 
voting rights in the US. Without avoiding emotionally charged tone, he declared: 
“I will not forget. I cannot forget—indeed America cannot forget—the pain, suffer-
ing, and sorrow of those who died for equal protection and for this precious right 
to vote”. Then judge Keith included thirty-seven pictures of persons killed while 
struggling for voting rights in the fifties and sixties. Using their pictures (supple-
mented with their short bios) could be interpreted as a tool which enabled the judge 
to express his emotional state. The pictures used in such way create, as Goodrich 
stated in references to another opinion with images, “momentary window onto the 
Judge’s motives, a glimpse of intent and desire” [9: 38].
(3) Images can play a role in fostering judicial authenticity and candor. Although 
images are often interpreted only as tools for making certain meanings easier to 
apprehend, they should also be considered as devices that enhance the authenticity 
of judicial opinions. This is a highly complicated issue because the candor could 
be understood differently and as such is a multi-level phenomenon. For example, 
Richard Posner is the judge who quite often (especially in comparison with the aver-
age judge) uses images in his opinions (see e.g. Sandifer v. US Steel Corp. 678 F.3d 
590 [7th Cir. 2012]; Conrad v. AM Community Credit Union 750 F.3d 634 [7th Cir. 
2014]). His strong tendency to insert the images, most likely photos, can be seen as 
his deliberatly employed style of writing of judicial opinions. This is a very specific 
type of judicial candor, often omitted in the literature, indicating that opinions are 
being prepared in a way that manifests the author’s vision of the desirable way of 
their both form and content. As a part of being faithful to his own writing style, Pos-
ner sometimes inserts the images into the main body of the opinion [see 20].
(4) Looking from Frank’s perspective, some cases of using images in judicial 
opinions should be interpreted as instances of trying to “say it with music”. Prob-
ably the most important lesson from reading Frank in this context is the reconceptu-
alization of the practice of inserting images into judicial opinions. Rather than being 
conceptualized in the text-vs-pictures framework, it should be interpreted on a back-
ground of “pure” and “impure” styles of writing the judicial opinions. This implies 
that some cases of using the images should be understood as a way of searching 
for modes of expressions, “new forms to symbolize feelings” [6: 931]. In this light, 
some instances of inserting images into judicial opinions should be put in the line 
with certain textual attempts, such as using poetic tools, but also diagrams and 
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charts making the narrative simpler, more creative, innovation-searching. It breaks 
down the differentiation between textual and non-textual elements of opinions and 
suggests the new one—the dichotomy between the scholastic and petrified style of 
writing versus the innovation-searching style that looks for new ways of expressing 
the meanings.
As an illustration, let us consider the judge Fred Biery’s opinion in the case 35 
Bar and Grille LLC. v. The City of San Antonio, 943 F2d 706 (2013). It concerns 
the imposition of new clothing requirements by the City of San Antonio on the strip 
clubs. The whole tone of the opinion is based on an intended language ambiguities. 
Moreover, the opinion includes a paraphrase of the Bible and other works of litera-
ture, such as Hamlet and To Kill a Mockingbird. The overall tone of the main part 
of the opinion could be characterized as cryptic, allusive, associational, and even 
humorous. It is also because the judge inserted the picture of the local dancer—Miss 
Wiggles, who, what is important, hasn’t been in any direct way related to the case. 
The photo shows Miss Wiggles, an exotic artist, completely dressed, spinning on 
head on the swivel chair. This photo works hand in hand with the text, they both 
complement each other to produce the overall effect. Also the photo of Miss Wig-
gles could be read as a metaphor directing the reader toward the registers of mean-
ing that lie beyond the expressed reason-giving. It is a hidden argument for the regu-
lation of the nudity in San Antonio’s strip clubs. As Goodrich noted in reference to 
35 Bar and Grille LLC case, “this use of image is essential to a proper understand-
ing of the judgment, to the reconstruction of its motivation and to apprehension of 
its scope” [9: 38].
(5) What is inherent in Frank’s writings, but missing in the dominant literature, 
is the difference between visualization of thought, a process oriented toward a future 
audience, and cases where the thought encapsulated through images is a process of 
reflecting on the past by the decision maker.
By analyzing the gaps in the current literature and drawing on the ideas expressed 
by Frank in his essay Say It With Music, it has been possible to highlight the impor-
tance of understanding the judicial decision-making process and the role of the 
judge when considering how images function within judicial opinions—an aspect 
so far ignored by contemporary scholars. The findings of this paper do not claim to 
reshape the whole way of thinking about images in judicial opinions, but rather they 
open a new territory for consideration. Hopefully, this will encourage future authors 
to question the dominant approaches in the current literature and allow room for a 
more nuanced way of using images in judicial opinions.
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